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Abstract—Wireless networks in open environment are exposed
to various large region threats, like the natural disasters and
malicious attacks. Available work regarding region failures gen-
erally adopt a kind of “deterministic” failure models, which failed
to reflect some key features of a real region failure. In this
paper, we provide a more general “probabilistic” region failure
model to capture the key features of a region failure and apply
it for the vulnerability assessment of wireless mesh networks.
To facilitate such assessment, we develop a grid partition-based
scheme to estimate the expected flow capacity degradation from a
random region failure. We then establish a theoretical framework
to determine a suitable grid partition such that a specified
estimation error requirement is satisfied. The grid partition
technique is also useful for identifying the vulnerable zones of a
network, which can guide network designers to initiate proper
network protection against such failures. The work in this paper
helps us understand the network vulnerability under a region
failure, and can facilitate the design and maintenance of future
highly survivable wireless networks.
Index Terms—Wireless mesh networks, region failure, network
vulnerability.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the wireless mesh networks have increas-
ingly gained interests in both academia and industry. As a
promising and flexible networking technology, the wireless
mesh networks are expected to support data communications
for some important and mission critical applications, like the
disaster relief and battlefield headquarter construction. Due
to the nature of wireless communications, the nodes there
are exposed to various hazards [1]–[3], such as the natural
disasters and malicious network attacks [4], [5]. Thus, the pre-
active evaluation of network vulnerability and survivability
against network failures becomes essential for the design
and maintenance of future highly survivable wireless mesh
networks.
In the light of failure inevitability and its detrimental con-
sequences, many studies have been dedicated to the design
of failure-resilient networks. Stefanakos et al. examined the
routing issue in networks that require guaranteed reliability
against multiple link failures in [6]. In [7] Awerbuch et al.
proposed an on-demand routing protocol for ad hoc wire-
less networks, which provides resilience to byzantine failures
caused by individual or colluding nodes. In [8] Bhandari
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and Vaidya considered the problem of reliable broadcast in
a wireless network where each node can fail independently.
In [9] Yu and Zhang proposed R-Sentry, a novel scheduling
algorithm for sensor networks that attempts to bound the ser-
vice loss duration due to node failures and provides continuous
surveillance coverage even when a subset of sensors fail. The
fast restoration and protection against link and node failures
have also been explored recently, see, for example [10]–[13].
Most of available network survivability studies are based
on one common assumption: failures are random and inde-
pendent, which failed to reflect many real scenarios. The
real-world disasters or attacks, like the earthquake, hurricane,
physical bomb explosion or electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
attack [14], [15], always happen in a particular geographical
location and result in the so-called region failure ( [16], [17]).
Under a region failure, multiple network components may
simultaneously corrupt but they are geographically correlated
and constrained within a specific region. Thus, it is important
to take into account the geographical information of networks
in the study of such failures, and some research has been
conducted to understand the impact of region failures on wired
backbone networks ( [17]–[19]). In this paper, we focus on
the vulnerability assessment of wireless mesh networks under
a random region failure.
There are few related works considering region failures
inside wireless networks. Sen et al. explored the region-
based connectivity issue in wireless networks and showed
how to adjust the transmitting power to maintain a region-
based connectivity in presence of region failures [16], [20].
This work was further extended into multiple region failure
model (MRFM) [21], where the failures are no longer confined
within a single region. In [22] Xu et al. adopted the percolation
theory to characterize the spread of correlated failures in large
wireless networks, and analyzed the condition under which an
initial node failure will/will not permeate the whole network.
Azimi et al. in [23] addressed the problem of building data
redundancy with the minimum communication cost in a sensor
network, where many nodes may simultaneously fail due to a
bomb attack or river overflow.
It is notable that the region failure models adopted in
previous region failure-related studies (for both wired and
wireless networks) can be regarded as a kind of “deter-
ministic” failure models, like the single circular model in
[16], [18], [20], [21], [23], and line cut model in [17]–[19],
where any network component intersecting with the concerned
failure region will always be destroyed (i.e., destroyed with
probability 1). These “deterministic” failure models, although
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simple and easy to use, neglected two key facts of real-world
region failures: network components can only be destroyed
with certain probability (not always probability 1), and more
importantly, such failure probability of a network component
tends to monotonously decrease as it is farther away from
the region center. Based on this observation, we believe a
“probabilistic” model addressing these two key features will
be much more suitable for network vulnerability study. In this
paper, we consider such a probabilistic failure model and apply
it to assess the vulnerability of wireless mesh networks. The
main contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We provide a general and more realistic probabilistic
region failure model to capture the key features of region
failures, which covers the deterministic failure models in
[16], [18] as special cases.
• Based on the new failure model, we formulate the ex-
pected flow capacity degradation problem in wireless
mesh networks as a network zone partition problem,
which is hard to solve for a large network. We then
develop a grid partition scheme to efficiently estimate the
expected flow capacity degradation from a random region
failure. The grid partition technique can also help us to
identify the vulnerable zones of a network.
• A theoretical framework is further established to analyze
the estimation error from using the grid partition tech-
nique, which can guide us to determine a suitable grid
partition such that a specified estimation error require-
ment is satisfied.
• We demonstrate through extensive theoretical and simu-
lation studies that neglecting probabilistic behavior of a
region failure may significantly over-estimate or under-
estimate its impact on network vulnerability.
The rest of this paper is outlined as follows. Section II in-
troduces the general probabilistic region failure model and the
problem formulation of expected flow capacity degradation.
In Section III, we develop a grid partition scheme to estimate
the average performance degradation caused by a random
region failure, and also provide the theoretical analysis on
the estimation error from using such grid partition. Section IV
presents the numerical results to validate the new region failure
model and the grid partition scheme. Finally we conclude this
paper in Section V.
II. MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we first define a general probabilistic region
failure model, then formulate the expected flow capacity
degradation from such a failure as a network zone partition
problem.
A. Probabilistic Region Failure Model
It is notable that one common feature of real-world attacks
(like the physical bomb explosion, E-bomb or EMP attack)
is that the power of such an attack gradually attenuates from
its center area to outer area. Due to this common feature, the
region failures caused by such attacks always share two com-
mon behaviors, i.e., a network component near attack center
will fail with high probability (may not always probability 1),
Fig. 1. Probabilistic Region Failure Model
and such failure probability tends to monotonously decrease
as it is farther away from the attack center.
To emulate these common failure behaviors, we introduce
here a general probabilistic region failure model.
Definition 1: (Probabilistic Region Failure Model) con-
sists of a set of M consecutive annulus, defined by M
concentric circles with radius ri, i = 1, . . . ,M , as illustrated
in Fig. 1. A network component (like a network node) falling
within i-th annulus will fail with probability pi, where annulus
are sequentially numbered from the failure center. To mimic
the above behaviors, the following properties hold for pi:
- The probability pi is monotonously decreasing, i,e, pi ≥
pi+1, i = 1, . . . ,M − 1.
- The region failure is only confined within the circle area
of radius rM , beyond which the failure probability is
regarded as 0.
It is noted our probabilistic region failure (PRF) model is
different from the previous “deterministic” failure models in
the sense that: 1) it is more general as it covers the former
single circular model in [16], [18] as a special case ; 2) it
is more realistic as it reflects the monotonously decreasing
trend of failure probability for real region failures; 3) it is
more flexible and can be configured with different parameter
settings to adapt to various realistic scenarios.
Without loss of generality, in the following we focus on
the simple two-annulus PRF model with M = 2, p1 = 1 and
p2 = p to simply the presentation 1.
B. Problem Formulation
Based on the above PRF model, we will assess the vulnera-
bility of a wireless mesh network under single random region
failure. In this paper, we choose to explore the impact of region
failure upon some specified key flows (like some mission
critical flows), and take the expected flow capacity degradation
as the network vulnerability metric 2. Here, the expected flow
capacity degradation is measured over all concerned flows
after region failure happens but before initiating the network
1For a small area around the region failure center, the failure probability
there can be high enough to be approximated as 1.
2Some other metrics can also be adopted for network vulnerability evalua-
tion, like the vertex based degree centrality [24], the operational O-D pairs or
paths, the minimum shortest paths [25]–[27], the critical vertex/edge [28]–[30]
and pairwise connectivity [31].
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Fig. 2. RFL zones {Zi} and their impacts {wi} of a flow
recovery mechanism, so it indicates the possible worst case
performance degradation after a region failure. This problem
can be defined as follows.
Expected Capacity Degradation Problem: For a given
network and the routing/capacity information of some specified
flows in it, calculate the expected capacity degradation of these
flows under a random region failure.
To solve the Expected Capacity Degradation (ECD) prob-
lem, one straightforward approach is to first apply the PRF
model to partition the overall network area into some disjoint
and uniform region failure location (RFL) zones.
Definition 2: (RFL Zone) A RFL zone is a network sub-
area that any PRF with center falling within it will always
induce the same impact (i.e., the same flow capacity degrada-
tion) to all the concerned flows.
For a simple scenario of having only one flow f with
capacity Cf and 3 nodes, such RFL zone partition is illustrated
in Fig. 2, where the network region is divided into different
RFL zones {Zi} with impacts {wi}, i = 1, ..., 10.
Based on the area of each RFL zone and its impact on
flow capacity degradation, we can easily evaluate the overall
ECD of all concerned flows under a random region failure.
For a network with coverage area Z, suppose we have already
divided network region into different RFL zones {Zt} with
different areas {|Zt|} and impacts {wt}, then the overall ECD
w can be determined as
w =
∑
Zt
|Zt|
Z
· wt (1)
Here |Zt|/Z is just the probability that the PRF’s center falls
within the RFL zone Zt.
To apply (1) for the evaluation of ECD, we need to find
out all the RFL zones. Such RFL zones depend on many
factors, like the node topology distribution (e.g., distance
among nodes, number of nodes), flow distribution (routing
path for each concerned flow, number of nodes per flow),
and also parameter settings of the PRF model (M and ri,
i = 1, . . . ,M ). Suppose the number of nodes of all concerned
flows is N , then we can see that total number of RFL zones
can be as high as O((M+1)N ) in the worst case. Also, finding
all these RFL zones and calculating their area involve a lot of
very complicated geometric operations. In the next section we
present an efficient scheme for the estimation of w.
III. ESTIMATION OF ECD
In this section, we first introduce a grid partition-based
scheme for the estimation of ECD, then provide a theoretical
analysis on the estimation error from using such grid partition
technique.
A. Grid Partition-based Estimation for ECD
Without loss of generality, we assume that the network
coverage area is an b × b square. We apply a grid to evenly
divide the b×b square into c×c small cells {Sj , j = 1, ..., c2}
with side length a = b/c each, as illustrated in Fig. 3. Based
on this grid partition, one simple way to estimate the ECD of
some concerned flows is to regard each cell here as a “RFL”
zone and take the impact of its center point as the impact of
this cell. In this way, we can get an estimation of ECD based
on the (1).
Suppose that the set of concerned flows are {fk, k =
1, ...,K}, and let (x∗j , y∗j ) be the central point of jth cell Sj ,
and let wfk(x, y) be the induced impact on flow fk when PRF
center is at point (x, y). Then the grid partition-based scheme
for obtaining an estimation wˆ of ECD can be summarized as
the following Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 ECD Estimation:
Input: The network grid partition information, flow distribu-
tion and failure model parameters;
Output: ECD estimation wˆ;
1. wˆ ⇐ 0;
2. for k = 1 to K do
3. for j = 1 to c2 do
4. calculate wfk(x∗j , y∗j );
5. wˆ = wˆ + (a2/b2) · wfk(x∗j , y∗j );
6. end for
7. end for
8. return wˆ;
In the Algorithm 1, we take the central point (x∗j , y∗j )
of cell Sj as the sampling point and simply use its impact
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j ) as an approximation of the impact of all other
points in Sj . Since each cell here may not be a RFL zone,
such approximation will cause an estimation error between
wˆ and w. For a flow with two nodes and capacity Cf , a
partition cell Sj that intersects with three RFL zones there
is illustrated in the Fig. 3. Notice that the three RFL zones
intersecting with Sj have distinct impacts of 0, p · Cf and
(1 − (1 − p)2) · Cf , respectively. Thus, talking the impact
p ·Cf of the center (x∗j , y∗j ) of Sj as an approximation of the
impacts of all other points (can be 0 or (1 − (1 − p)2) · Cf
here) will induce estimation error in the calculation of ECD
w.
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Fig. 3. Illustration of network grid partition and ECD estimation error for a
flow with only two nodes A and B. The cells of cases 2 and 3 will introduce
ECD estimation error while the cells of cases 1 and 4 will not.
In the next subsection, we provide a theoretical model on the
possible estimation error that the Algorithm 1 may introduce
in the estimation of w. Such a model can help us to determine
a suitable grid partition (i.e., a suitable cell size a) such that
a specified estimation error requirement is satisfied.
B. ECD Estimation Error Modeling
Based on the grid partition introduced above, the ECD w
and its estimation wˆ for the set of concerned flows {fk, k =
1, ...,K} can be expressed as
w =
1
b2
·
K∑
k=1
c2∑
j=1
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
wfk(x, y)dxdy (2)
wˆ =
1
b2
·
K∑
k=1
c2∑
j=1
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j )dxdy (3)
If we use ∆ to denote the estimation error of w, then we
have
∆ = |w − wˆ|
≤
K∑
k=1
∣∣∣ 1
b2
c2∑
j=1
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
(
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j )− wfk(x, y)
)
dxdy
∣∣∣
(4)
The (4) indicates that the overall estimation error ∆ is no more
than the sum of estimation error for the ECD of each flow.
If we use ∆fk to denote the estimation error for the ECD of
flow fk, then we have
∆fk =
∣∣∣ 1
b2
c2∑
j=1
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
(
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j )− wfk(x, y)
)
dxdy
∣∣∣
(5)
≤
c2∑
j=1
∣∣∣ 1
b2
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
(
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j )− wfk(x, y)
)
dxdy
∣∣∣
(6)
The (6) says that the estimation error ∆fk for flow fk is
upper bounded by the sum of corresponding estimation error
introduced in each cell. If we use ∆Sjfk to denote the maximum
difference between the average impact (on fk) of any two
points in Sj , i.e.,
∆
Sj
fk
= max
(x,y)∈Sj
{wfk(x, y)} − min
(x,y)∈Sj
{wfk(x, y)} (7)
then we have∣∣∣ 1
b2
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
(
wfk(x
∗
j , y
∗
j )− wfk(x, y)
)
dxdy
∣∣∣
≤
1
b2
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
∣∣∣wfk(x∗j , y∗j )− wfk(x, y)
∣∣∣dxdy
≤
1
b2
∫∫
(x,y)∈Sj
∆
Sj
fk
dxdy
=
1
c2
∆
Sj
fk
(8)
Combining (4), (5), (6) and (8), we have
∆ ≤
K∑
k=1
∆fk ≤
K∑
k=1
c2∑
j=1
1
c2
∆
Sj
fk
(9)
The (9) shows that we can control the overall estimation
error ∆ by properly selecting the number of cells c (or
equivalently the size a = b/c of each cell) in the grid-
partition based ECD estimation. Let Ck denote the capacity
of concerned flow fk, k = 1, ...,K, then we can define the
following ECD estimation error bounding problem.
ECD Estimation Error Bounding Problem: For an error
requirement ǫ > 0, to determine a low bound cǫ on the number
of cells c, such that when c > cǫ we can always guarantee
that
∆ ≤
K∑
k=1
c2∑
j=1
1
c2
∆
Sj
fk
≤ ǫ ·
K∑
k=1
Ck (10)
The (10) indicates that to determine the lower bound cǫ for
a given ǫ, we need to identify each cell that has non-zero term
∆
Sj
fk
(i.e., the cell that introduces estimation error) and also to
determine the total number of such cells, as discussed in the
following subsections.
C. Identification of Cells with Estimation Error
Based on the simple two-annulus PRF model introduced
in Section II-A, we can easily see that the area around a
network node can also be divided into two same annulus (as
shown in Fig. 3), where a PRF with center falling within the
inner annulus (resp. the outer annulus) will cause the node
to fail with probability 1 (resp. probability p). Thus, for a
given flow fk, whether a cell will introduce ECD estimation
error for this flow depends on how the cell intersects with
the boundaries of the outer annulus and inner annulus of all
the nodes of this flow (hereafter, we call these annulus as
the annulus of this flow). To characterize such intersection
between a cell S and the annulus of flow fk, we define a four-
tuple (mk, nk, hk, gk), which indicates that the cell partially
intersects with the boundaries of mk outer annulus and hk
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inner annulus of flow fk, but it completely falls within other
nk outer annulus and gk inner annulus of the flow.
Based on the four-tuple (mk, nk, hk, gk) for flow fk and a
cell S, the ∆Sfk defined by (7), i.e., the maximum difference
between the average impact (on fk) of any two points in S,
can be determined as
∆Sfk =


0 case 1: if gk ≥ 1,
Ck · q
nk
case 2: if gk = 0, hk ≥ 1,
Ck · q
nk ·
(
1− qmk
)
case 3: if gk = 0, hk = 0,mk ≥ 1,
0 case 4: if gk = 0, hk = 0,mk = 0.
(11)
where q = 1 − p is the non-failure probability of a node
falling within the outer annulus defined by the simple two-
annulus PRF model in Section II.A. The (11) indicates clearly
that only the cells of the cases 2 and 3 will introduce ECD
estimation error for the flow fk, as illustrated in the Fig. 3.
Let uk(λ) denote the total number of cells of the case 2
with nk = λ, and let vk(β, γ) denote the total number of cells
of the case 3 with mk = β and nk = γ, then the overall ECD
estimation error for the flow fk is given by
c2∑
j=1
1
c2
∆
Sj
fk
=
Ck
c2
·
(∑
λ≥1
uk(λ)q
λ +
∑
β≥1,γ≥0
vk(β, γ)
(
1− qβ
)
qγ
)
(12)
D. Counting the Cells with Estimation Error
The (10) and (12) indicate that to solve the overall esti-
mation error bounding problem, we need to determine the
values of uk(λ) and vk(β, γ) for each flow fk with λ ≥ 1,
β ≥ 1 and γ ≥ 0. However, determining the exact value of
uk(λ) and vk(β, γ) for each flow fk is still a very difficult
task, which involves the complicated geometric operation to
identify the relationship (intersecting or containing) between
cells and annulus boundaries of a flow. We instead provide
here a tractable upper bound to efficiently approximate the
ECD estimation error in (12).
Notice from the Fig. 3 that the effect of a PRF upon a
network node is defined by the two annulus around the node,
and our basic idea here is to first derive a general “node-level
estimation error (NEE)” for each node of flow fk based on
the intersection between its two annulus and cells around the
node, then apply the NEE of each node to get a general bound
on the ECD estimation error of this flow.
To get a general NEE for each node, we need to identify
all the cells around a node that will “contribute” to the
ECD estimation error. For this purpose, we consider a tagged
node A and one its neighbor node B that is dmax away, as
illustrated in Fig. 4. Here the dmax is defined as the maximum
distance between any two neighbor nodes of any flow, which is
controlled by the maximum communication range (or power)
of the network. We use CAin and CAout, CBin and CBout to denote
Fig. 4. Illustration for the cell counting, where the distance between the
nodes A and B is fixed as dmax, and the network is partitioned with cells
of size a each.
the inner annulus and outer annulus of A and B, respectively.
Then the cells that may introduce ECD estimation error to the
node A can be defined by the following variables:
• v¯1: the number of cells partially intersecting with the
boundary of CAout but not completely falling within
C
B
in ∪ C
B
out.
• v¯2: the number of cells partially intersecting with the
boundary of CAout and completely falling within CBin ∪
C
B
out.
• u¯1: the number of cells partially intersecting with the
boundary of CAin but not completely falling within the
C
B
in ∪ C
B
out.
• u¯2: if u¯1 > 0, u¯2 is defined as the total number of
cells that partially intersect with the boundary of CAin
and completely fall within the CBin ∪ CBout. In the case
u¯1 = 0, u¯2 is the number of cells that partially intersect
with the boundary of CAin and not completely fall within
the CBin.
For the example shown in Fig. 4, we can easily prove that
the u¯1, u¯2, v¯1 and v¯2 there are given by the formulas in Table I
and II.
Remark 1: The values of u¯1, u¯2, v¯1 and v¯2 in Tables I and
II are only determined by the network parameters dmax, r1
and r2 and thus independent of flows.
Remark 2: For the tagged node A and its neighbor node
B in Fig. 4, the boundaries of their outer annulus are not
intersecting with the network boundary. Thus, the results in
Tables I and II represent the maximum values of u¯1, u¯2, v¯1
and v¯2.
Based on the u¯1, u¯2, v¯1 and v¯2 in the Tables I and II, we
can define NEEk (i.e., the NEE for each node of flow fk)
as
NEEk =
Ck
c2
·
(
u¯1q + u¯2q
2 + v¯1p+ v¯2pq
) (13)
We now show that the NEEk can be used to establish
an upper bound for the overall ECD estimation error (12)
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TABLE I
u¯1 AND u¯2
TABLE II
v¯1 AND v¯2
dmax v¯1 v¯2
dmax ≤ 2r2 4⌈
2r2
a
⌉ − v¯2 4⌈
2r2
a
⌉ 1
π
arccos
dmax
2r2
dmax > 2r2 4⌈
2r2
a
⌉ 0
of the flow fk, as summarized in the following lemma (See
Section VI for the proof).
Lemma 1: Given the PRF model parameters r1 and r2, cell
side length a, then for any flow fk, 1 ≤ k ≤ K, we have
Ck
c2
·
(∑
λ≥1
uk(λ)q
λ +
∑
β≥1,γ≥0
vk(β, γ)
(
1− qβ
)
qγ
)
≤ Nk ·NEEk (14)
E. A Lower Bound for Estimation Error Guarantee
By combining the (10), (12) and (14), we can easily prove
the following theorem regarding a lower bound cǫ of c for a
specified error requirement ǫ.
Theorem 1: For a specified error requirement ǫ > 0, we can
determine a lower bound cǫ for c as follows such that when
c ≥ cǫ, the (10) always holds.
1) when dmax ≤ r2 − r1 & r2 ≤ 3r1, or dmax ≤ 2r1 &
r2 > 3r1,
cǫ =
8
ǫπb
∑K
k=1 Ck
×
K∑
k=1
NkCk
(
r1(π − arccos
dmax
2r1
)(1− p)2
+ r2(π − p arccos
dmax
2r2
) · p
)
(15)
2) when 2r1 < dmax ≤ r2 − r1 & r2 > 3r1,
cǫ =
8
ǫπb
∑K
k=1 Ck
K∑
k=1
NkCk
(
r1π(1− p)
2
+ r2(π − p arccos
dmax
2r2
) · p
)
(16)
3) when r2 − r1 < dmax ≤ r2 + r1,
cǫ =
8
ǫπb
∑K
k=1 Ck
×
K∑
k=1
NkCk
(
r1(π − arccos
d2max + r
2
1 − r
2
2
2dmaxr1
)(1− p)
+ r1 arccos
d2max + r
2
1 − r
2
2
2dmaxr1
(1− p)2
+ r2(π − p arccos
dmax
2r2
) · p
)
(17)
4) when r2 + r1 < dmax ≤ 2r2,
cǫ =
8
ǫπb
∑K
k=1 Ck
K∑
k=1
NkCk
(
r1π(1− p)
+ r2(π − p arccos
dmax
2r2
) · p
)
(18)
5) when dmax > 2r2,
cǫ =
8
ǫb
∑K
k=1 Ck
K∑
k=1
NkCk
(
r1(1− p) + r2p
)
(19)
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we first verify the efficiency of the ECD
estimation scheme through simulation, then apply it to assess
the network vulnerability under the new PRF model.
A. Simulation Setting
We developed a simulator in C++ to simulate the impact
of a random PRF upon on some specified flows. Similar to
the settings used in [16], we consider a random network with
32 nodes, in which the coordinates (x, y) of each node are
uniformly generated in a 2000× 2000 m2 field. We randomly
generate eight flows, where the number of nodes per flow is
drawn randomly in [3, 5], each link distance is drawn randomly
in [100, 400] m, and the flow capacity is drawn randomly in
[3, 10] Mbps. The final network graph for simulation is shown
in Fig. 8a, in which the maximum distance between any two
neighbor nodes of any flow is determined as dmax = 360.555.
The metric adopted for performance evaluation is the average
impact ratio (AIR), defined as
AIR =
w∑K
k=1 Ck
(20)
The simulated AIR was calculated as the average value of ten
batches of simulation results, where each batch consists of one
million random and independent simulations.
B. PRF Model and “Deterministic” Failure Models
To illustrate how the general PRF model is different from
the “Deterministic” failure models, we first conducted a sim-
ulation under the general parameter setting for (p1, p2). The
Fig. 5 illustrates the variations of AIR with the parameters
(r1, r2, p1, p2), where the settings (p1 = 1, p2 = 1) and
(p1 = 1, p2 = 0) correspond to the “deterministic” model
scenarios.
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(a) Average Impact Ratio vs. r2/r1
(b) Average Impact Ratio vs. r1
Fig. 5. PRF Model and “Deterministic” Failure Models.
The results here indicate clearly that the “deterministic”
models, although simple and easy to use, may result in
a significant overestimation or underestimation of network
vulnerability. For example, when we set r2/r1 = 3.6 in
Fig. 5a, we get an average impact ratio of 0.102 with the
setting of (p1 = 0.95, p2 = 0.25), while this ratio decreases
to 0.032 with the setting of (p1 = 1, p2 = 0). Regarding the
results of fixed r2/r1 in Fig. 5b, we can see that when r1 = 80,
the average impact ratio is estimated as 0.116 for the case
(p1 = 0.95, p2 = 0.75), and this estimated ratio increases to
0.141 when both p1 and p2 are regarded as 1 there. It is also
interesting to note that as r1 (or r2/r1) increases (and thus
failure region becomes bigger), the estimation gap between
the probabilistic model and the corresponding “deterministic”
ones tends to increase sharply, and such gaps can be very
significant if the probabilistic feature of region failure is not
properly “rounded-off”.
C. ECD Estimation Scheme Validation
To verify the the ECD estimation scheme, further simulation
was conducted under the simple PRF model of (p1 = 1, p2 =
p). The parameters used in the simulation are summarized
in Table III, where each case of parameter setting is corre-
sponding to one individual case discussed in the Theorem 1.
We verified the ECD estimation scheme under two error
requirements of ǫ = 0.01 and ǫ = 0.005. The corresponding
simulation results and estimation results from our scheme are
summarized in the Table IV.
The Table IV indicates clearly that when we set c ≥ cǫ,
TABLE III
FAILURE MODEL PARAMETER SETTINGS
p r1 r2
case 1 0.50 50 100
case 2 0.35 80 200
case 3 0.25 100 500
case 4 0.75 180 200
case 5 0.15 200 600
case 6 0.10 200 700
TABLE IV
COMPARISON BETWEEN SIMULATION AND ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR
MODEL VALIDATION, C =
∑
8
k=1
Ck
w/C wˆ/C ∆/C cǫ
case 1 ǫ = 0.01 0.0201332 0.0200634 6.98e-005 126
ǫ = 0.005 0.0201248 0.0201419 1.70e-005 252
case 2 ǫ = 0.01 0.05511 0.0550707 3.93e-005 199
ǫ = 0.005 0.0551315 0.0551305 1.03e-006 398
case 3 ǫ = 0.01 0.160276 0.160349 7.28e-005 284
ǫ = 0.005 0.160279 0.160315 3.62e-005 569
case 4 ǫ = 0.01 0.106664 0.106649 1.47e-005 295
ǫ = 0.005 0.106683 0.106636 4.70e-005 590
case 5 ǫ = 0.01 0.193783 0.193646 1.36e-004 350
ǫ = 0.005 0.193819 0.19378 3.96e-005 701
case 6 ǫ = 0.01 0.189801 0.18987 6.90e-005 346
ǫ = 0.005 0.189838 0.189847 9.57e-006 693
our scheme could provide an efficient estimation for the AIR,
and the induced overall estimation error is always less than
the specified ǫ. It is also notable that for each test case here,
the actual error between the simulation and estimation results
is several orders smaller than the specified ǫ. This very small
overall estimation error (and thus a very safe cǫ) are due to the
following facts. The first factor is that the maximum possible
estimation error (rather than the real estimation error) of each
cell is adopted in the evaluation of the overall ECD estimation
error (Eq. 12). The second factor lies in that the estimation of
the number of error-inducing cells in (13), in which only the
maximum values for u¯1 and v¯1 are considered, while the errors
of other cells are approximated through u¯2 and v¯2. The last
factor is that the distance between any two neighbor nodes is
always regarded as dmax in the Theorem 1, which helps us to
derive an unified and closed form formula for cǫ but leads to
an overestimation for the parameter.
The above results indicate that our ECD estimation scheme
and the related theoretical framework for estimation error
bounding, although may lead to a “conservative” estimation
for the overall ECD, are simple and efficient. To apply such
scheme, we just need to divide the network area into c × c
cells and simply use the central point of each cell to calculate
the ECD metric, which avoids the complicated geometric
operations for the identification and area evaluation of all
RFL zones. As long as the cell size a is small enough (or
equivalently the number of cells c is big enough such that
c ≥ cǫ), our scheme can always result in a very efficient
estimation for the ECD with an error upper bounded by ǫ.
Hereafter, the numerical results in performance evaluation
are obtained based on our ECD estimation scheme, where
the simple PRF model of (p1 = 1, p2 = p) and an error
requirement of ǫ = 0.005 are assumed.
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Fig. 6. Average Impact Ratio vs. Failure Probability p
Fig. 7. Average Impact Ratio vs. r2/r1.
D. Average Impact Ratio vs. Failure Model Parameters
The Fig. 6 shows the relationship between the AIR and the
failure probability p under different settings of r2/r1, where
the setting r2/r1 = 1 corresponds to a “deterministic” model.
We can see from the Fig. 6 that with r1 = 100, a non-
negligible AIR difference between r2/r1 > 1 (r2/r1 =2,4,5,7)
and r2/r1 = 1 can be observed even for a very small value
of the failure probability p. For example, when p = 0.2, the
AIR of the scenario r2/r1 = 2 is 0.050, which is nearly 1.56
times as that of the scenario r2/r1 = 1 (0.032 there); for the
case that p = 0.35, the AIR of the first scenario (0.062) is
nearly 1.94 times as that of the later case (0.032). The Fig. 6
also shows clearly that as r2 or p increase, the AIR difference
between r2/r1 > 1 and r2/r1 = 1 increases sharply. This
results indicates that even for a very small failure probability p,
the probabilistic outer annulus part of a PRF may significantly
affect the overall network capacity.
When failure probability is set as p = 0.5, the relationship
between AIR and r2/r1 is illustrated in the Fig. 7. We can
see from the figure that in general, as r1 increases, the AIR
becomes more sensitive to the variation of the ratio r2/r1.
For example, when r2/r1 varies from 1.6 to 3.6, the AIR for
the scenario of r1 = 100 varies from 0.056 to 0.159 and the
AIR for the scenario of r1 = 200 varies from 0.162 to 0.404,
respectively. The results here also show clearly that for the
case r1 = 450, the AIR is not sensitive to the variation of
r2/r1 anymore as it increases beyond the point r2/r1 = 4.4.
This is because that when r1 and r2 are large enough, the PRF
starts to cover the whole network area and thus all the flows. A
(a) Network topology
(K = 8, dmax = 360.555)
(b) Vulnerable zone distribution
(r1 = 200, r2 = 600, a = 40)
Fig. 8. Network topology and vulnerable network zone distribution estimated
by our scheme.
more careful observation of the Fig. 7 indicates that even with
a PRF of r1 = 360 (roughly same as the dmax = 360.555)
and r2/r1 = 2.4, we may achieve an over 50% reduction
(i.e.,AIR > 0.5) to the overall capacity of the concerned
flows.
E. Vulnerable Network Zone Identification
In our grid partition-based ECD estimation scheme, we
divide the whole network area equally into c × c cells, then
take the central point of each cell as the sampling point and
use its impact to approximate the impact of the cell. Thus,
one attractive application of the estimation scheme is that it
helps us to identify the geographical distribution and size of
the vulnerable network zones.
For the network adopted in our study (Fig. 8a) and the
setting of (r1 = 200, r2 = 600, a = 40), the vulnerable
network zone distribution estimated by our scheme is illus-
trated in Fig. 8b. Based on such vulnerable network zone
distribution, one can also easily identify the most vulnerable
network zone(s), i.e., the zones in which each cell there has the
biggest impact to the network flow capacity. Such vulnerable
network zone distribution and the most vulnerable network
zone information will be helpful for network designers to ini-
tiate proper network protection strategy against region failures.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a more realistic probabilistic
region failure (PRF) model to capture some main features of
geographically correlated region failures, and then developed
a framework to apply the PRF model for the vulnerability
assessment of wireless mesh networks. Our results indicate
that neglecting some key properties of real region failures can
result in a significant overestimation or underestimation of net-
work vulnerability, which may mislead network designers in
initiating proper and cost-efficient network protection against
such failures. It is expected that our work in this paper will
contribute to the future network design and planning against
possible region failures.
Some possible extensions of this work are:
• Routing issue: Notice that our framework in this paper
can be applied to evaluate a network with a given routing
strategy. How to apply this work and the corresponding
results (like the vulnerable network zone distribution
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information) to find efficient and region failure-tolerant
routing algorithm to alleviate the impacts of region failure
can be an interesting work.
• Recovery issue: We only considered the PRF impact
before network recovery (like topology reconfigure and
flow rerouting), so it only indicates the worst case net-
work performance degradation. How to extend this work
to estimate the network performance degradation (like
the flow capacity degradation) after network recovery
deserves further study.
• Vulnerability under other metrics: To have a more deeper
understanding of network vulnerability under PRF, an-
other future work is to extend the framework established
in this paper to further evaluate the network performance
degradation under other metrics, like the pairwise con-
nectivity [31], critical vertex/edge [28]–[30], etc.
VI. APPENDIX
Based on the (12) and (13) we know that to prove the (14),
we just need to show that for any fk the following condition
holds
∑
λ≥1
uk(λ)q
λ +
∑
β≥1,γ≥0
vk(β, γ)
(
1− qβ
)
qγ
≤ Nk
(
u¯1q + u¯2q
2 + v¯1p+ v¯2pq
) (21)
From the discussion in Section III-C we know that only the
cells of cases 2 and 3 in (11) will introduce the ECD estimation
error. We first consider the first term regarding the case 2 cells
in the left side of (21), i.e., the term ∑λ≥1 uk(λ)qλ. Since
the dmax is the maximum distance between any two neighbor
nodes of any flow, it is trivial to see that uk(1) ≤ Nk · u¯1.
Based on the definitions of u¯1 and u¯2, and also notice that qλ
monotonically decreases as λ increases, we have
∑
λ≥1
uk(λ)q
λ ≤ Nk
(
u¯1q + u¯2q
2
) (22)
Similarly, for the cells belonging to the case 3 in (11), we
have the following inequalities for any fk
∑
β≥1
β · vk(β, 0) ≤ Nk · v¯1 (23)
and ∑
β≥1,γ≥1
β · vk(β, γ) ≤ Nk · v¯2 (24)
Now we consider the second term in the left side of (21),
i.e.,
∑
β≥1,γ≥0 vk(β, γ)
(
1−qβ
)
qγ , where the component (1−
qβ)qγ increases with β but decreases with γ. Since some cells
of the case 3 are associated with a big value of β but a small
value of γ, we can not directly derive a similar inequality like
the (22) for the case 3 cells. For a case 3 cell Sj counted
as vk(β, γ), its maximum estimation error, i.e., the maximum
difference between the average impact (on fk) of any two
points in it, is given by
∆
Sj
fk
= Ckq
γ
(
1− qβ
)
= Ckq
γ
β∑
i=1
(−1)
(
β
i
)
(−p)i
≤ Ckq
γ · p · β
= Ckq
γ
(
1− q
)
· β (25)
Based on the (25), we first establish the following results
regarding the second term in the left side of (21) under the
special case that β ≥ 1 and γ = 0,∑
β≥1
vk(β, 0)
(
1− qβ
)
≤
∑
β≥1
vk(β, 0) · p · β (26)
=
∑
β≥1
β · vk(β, 0) · p
≤ Nk · v¯1 · p (27)
where inequalities (26) and (27) are due to the (25) and (23),
respectively.
We now show that for the general case β ≥ 1, γ ≥ 1, we
have ∑
β≥1,γ≥1
vk(β, γ)
(
1− qβ
)
qγ
≤
∑
β≥1,γ≥1
vk(β, γ) · q
γ · p · β (28)
≤
∑
β≥1,γ≥1
β · vk(β, γ) · q · p
≤ Nk · v¯2 · q · p (29)
where inequalities (28) and (29) are due to the (25) and (24),
respectively.
Combining the (27) and (29), the following inequality for
the cells of case 3 follows,∑
β≥1,γ≥0
vk(β, γ)
(
1− qβ
)
qγ ≤ Nk
(
v¯1p+ v¯2pq
) (30)
Finally, the (21) comes after the (22) and (30).
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